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Abstract
This paper presents a collection of four different classes of weighted Shapley levels values.
All classes contain generalisations of the weighted Shapley values to cooperative games
with a level structure. The first class is an upgrade of the weighted Shapley levels value
in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), who use the size of components as weights. The
following classes contain payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set. Hence they satisfy the
dummy axiom, in contrary to the values in the first class in general. The second class
contains extensions of the McLean weighted coalition structure values (Dragan, 1992;
Levy and McLean, 1989; McLean, 1991). The first two classes satisfy the level game
property (the payoff to all players of a component sum up to the payoff to the component
in a game where components are the players) and the last two classes meet a null player
out property. As a special case, the first three classes include the Shapley levels value and
the last class contains a new extension of the Shapley value.
Keywords Cooperative game · Level structure · (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value ·
Weighted proportionality · Harsanyi set · Dividends
1 Introduction
Many organizations, companies, corporations, governments and so on are organized in
hierarchical structures. Typically we have only one entity at the apex and in the following
levels each entity is splitted up in two or more subordinates which normally have a lower
rank as the superior one. A similar organizational structure, in some respects, show supply
chains. Effectiveness can be increased by sharing or pooling of physical objects, resources
and information. Queueing problems or electricity and other networks have a related
background. A central characteristic of all such organizational forms are cooperation
benefits. The question is how realized benefits should be shared and arising costs should
be allocated.
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2To distribute profits of cooperating coalitions the use of a cooperative game seems to be
a natural approach. Winter (1989) formulated a model for cooperative games with hierar-
chical structure, called level structure, which consists of a sequence of coalition structures
(the levels). In each level the player set is partitioned into components. Winter’s value
(Winter, 1989) for such a model, we call it Shapley levels value, extends the Owen value
(Owen, 1977), itselves an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). So this value
satisfies extensions of the symmetry axioms which are satisfied by the Owen value.
To treat symmetric players differently if there exist exogenous given weights for the
players, Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values. Levy and McLean
(1989) and McLean (1991) extended these values to coalition structures. Therefore they
assigned weights to the components of the coalition structure. Dragan (1992) called one
class of these values McLean weighted coalition structure values and presented for them
a formula related to that of the Owen value. A different approach took Vidal-Puga
(2012). He introduced a value for coalition structures with weights given by the size of
the coalitions. Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) extended it to level structures with a
step by step top-down proceeding. Contrary to the McLean weighted coalition structure
values their values don’t satisfy the dummy axiom.
This paper introduces four classes1 of values for level structures. All of them are exten-
sions of the weighted Shapley values. Our first class, called weighted Shapley hierarchy
levels values, generalizes the value from Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) to values with
arbitrary positive weights and therefore these values don’t satisfy the dummy axiom in
general. The computation needs to be done strictly hierarchical, step by step, top down.
Each of the following three classes can be represented by a formula with dividends
(Harsanyi, 1959). The coefficients in the formulas form a dividend share system, meaning
that all coefficients are non-negative and sum up to 1 for each coalition. Thus the values
from these classes are all payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set (Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev,
1978) and inherit all properties of these payoff vectors.
An unanimity game related to a coalition T gives a short impression how the values from
these three classes work: In the first class, called weighted Shapley support levels values,
each player of coalition T is supported by the weights of the components containing her;
in the second class, called weighted Shapley alliance levels values, all players of coalition
T who are elements of the same component form an alliance; in the last class, called
weighted Shapley collaboration levels values, all players of a component which is a subset
of coalition T collaborate.
The outline of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries,
section 3 presents the axioms and section 4 gives a quick look on the Shapley levels value.
In each of the following sections, which form the main part of this paper, we introduce a
new class of values, in section 5 the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values, in section 6
the weighted Shapley support levels values, in section 7 the weighted Shapley alliance
levels values and in section 8 the weighted Shapley collaboration levels values. Section 9
presents the Shapley collaboration levels value. Section 10 gives the conclusion. An
1All of these classes are special cases of values for level structures proposed in Besner (2016). Similar as
Casajus (2017) presented a class of solutions ϕω, which generalize the weighted Shapley values and the
proportional Shapley value (Besner, 2016; Be´al et al., 2017; Gangolly, 1981), Besner introduced classes
of solutions which extend the weighted Shapley values and the proportional Shapley value to values for
level structures. In this paper we concentrate only on extensions of weighted Shapley values and will
present correlated extensions of the proportional Shapley value in a separate article.
3appendix (section 11) provides all the proofs and some related lemmas.
2 Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers and by R++ the set of all positive real numbers. Let
U be a countably infinite set, the universe of all players, and denote by N the set of all
non-empty and finite subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-
game) is a pair (N, v) consisting of a set of players N ∈ N and a coalition function
v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0, where 2N is the power set of N . We refer to a TU-game also by v.
The subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions, v(S) is the worth of coalition S and the set of
all nonempty subsets of S is denoted by ΩS. The set of all TU-games with player set N is
denoted by GN. The restriction of (N, v) to the player set S ∈ ΩN is denoted by (S, v).
Let N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅. (1)
Another well-known formula of the dividends is given for all S ∈ ΩN by
∆v(S) =
∑
R⊆S
(−1)|S|−|R|v(R). (2)
A game (N, uT ), T ∈ ΩN, with uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0 otherwise is called an
unanimity game. It is well-known that any v ∈ GN has an unique presentation
v =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )uT . (3)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). We call a coalition S ⊆ N active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0.
Player i ∈ N is called a dummy player if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}), S ⊆ N\{i}; if
in addition v({i}) = 0, then i is called a null player; players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called
symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), and (mutually) dependent (Nowak and
Radzik, 1995) in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A coalition structure B on N is a partition of the player set N , i.e. a collection
of nonempty, pairwise disjoint, and mutually exhaustive subsets of N . Each B ∈ B is
called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player i ∈ N . A
level structure (Winter, 1989) on N is a finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition
structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, on N such that:
• B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N}.
• Bh+1 = {N}.
• For each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br is a refinement of Br+1, i. e. Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N .
Br is called the r-th level of B; B is the set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels
Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h; Br(B) is the component of the r-th level which contains the component
B ∈ B`, 0 ≤ ` ≤ r ≤ h+ 1.
4The collection of all level structures with player set N is denoted by LN. A TU-game
(N, v) ∈ GN together with a level structure B ∈ LN is an LS-game (N, v,B). If N and B
are clear, we refer to an LS-game also only by v. The set of all LS-games on N is defined
by GLN. Note that each TU-game (N, v) corresponds to an LS-game (N, v,B0) with a
trivial level structure B0 := {B0,B1} and we would like to say that each LS-game
(N, v,B1), B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, corresponds to a game with coalition structure (Aumann
and Dre`ze, 1974), also known as ”games with a priori unions” (Owen, 1977).
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and T ∈ ΩN :
• From a level structure on N follows a level structure on T by eliminating the players
in N\T . With coalition structures Br|T := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ∩ T 6= ∅}, 0 ≤ r ≤
h + 1, the new level structure on T is given by B|T := {B0|T , ...,Bh+1|T} ∈ LT and
(T, v,B|T ) ∈ GLT is called the restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
• We denote by BrI |T , 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, the coalition structure on T, given by
BrI |T :=
{
{T}, if r = h+ 1,{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ (Br∩ T ), Br∈ Br, B * B′∈ B, B′⊆ (Br∩ T )}, else.
With the level structure BI |T = {B0I |T , ...,Bh+1I |T} ∈ LT the LS-game (T, v,BI |T ) ∈
GLT is called the internally induced restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
• We define Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the induced r-th level
structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players, where Brk :=
{{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ B′} : B′ ∈ Br+k}, 0 ≤ k ≤ h + 1 − r. If T = ⋃B⊆T B, B ∈ Br,
and we want to stress this property, T is denoted by T r. Each such T r is related
to a coalition of all players B ∈ Br, B ⊆ T r, in the induced r-th level structure,
denoted by T r := {B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r} and vice versa. The induced r-th level game(Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr is given by
vr(T r) := v(T r) for all T r∈ ΩBr. (4)
Let N ∈ N . A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns to any v ∈ GN a payoff vector
φ(N, v) ∈ RN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns payoff vectors ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN
to all LS-games (N, v, B) ∈ GLN.
We define W := {f : U → R++} with wi := w(i) for all w ∈ W and i ∈ U and
W := {f : N → R++} with wS := w(S) for all w ∈ W and S ∈ N , such that
wT = wT , T , T ∈ N , if T is a partition of T. (5)
Let N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and w ∈W. The (simply) weighted Shapley Value2 Shw (Shapley,
1953a) is defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
A special case of a weighted Shapley value, all weights are equal, is the Shapley value
Sh (Shapley, 1953b), defined by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
2We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987)
5The best-known LS-value is the Shapley levels value3 (Winter, 1989). We introduce this
value here with a formula presented in Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, eq. (1)):
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where (6)
KrT (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
The Shapley Levels Value ShL is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
It is easy to see that ShL coincides with Sh if B = B0.
All values above are payoff vectors from the Harsanyi set (Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev,
1978), also called selectope (Derks, Haller and Peters, 2000), where the payoffs are ob-
tained by distributing the dividends. The payoffs φpi in this set, titled Harsanyi payoffs,
are defined by
φpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
pSi ∆v(S), i ∈ N,
where the pSi are non-negative weights in a weight system p = (p
S
i )S∈ΩN, i∈S and sum up
to 1 for each coalition S. The collection PN on N of all such dividend share systems
p is given by
PN:=
{
p = (pSi )S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
pSi = 1 and p
S
i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
.
3 Axioms
In this section we present axioms used in the main parts and point out:
Convention 3.1. In the case of using a subdomain, we require an axiom to hold when
all games belong to this subdomain. If there are used weights for some coalitions, these
weights are still valid for the same coalitions in the subdomain.
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values which are adaptions of standard-axioms
for TU-values (with the exception of the last axiom):
Efficiency, E. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Dummy, D. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and i ∈ N a dummy player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = v({i}).
Null player, N. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
3The value is also known as level(s) structure value or Winter’s (Shapley type) value. Our designation is
used e. g. in A´lvarez-Mozos et al. (2017).
6Null player out, NO4. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and j ∈ N a null player in v,
we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Internal (induced restriction) null player out, INO4. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN,
j ∈ N a null player in v, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Additivity, A. For all N ∈ N , B ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈ GLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Marginality, M. For all N ∈ N , B ∈ LN, v, v′∈ GLN and i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) =
MCv
′
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N, v′,B).
Coalitional strategic equivalence, CSE. For all N ∈ N , B ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈ GLN such
that for any T ∈ ΩN , c ∈ R and all S ⊆ N ,
v(S) =
{
v′(S) + c, if S ⊇ T,
v′(S), else,
(7)
we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N, v′,B) for all i ∈ N\T.
Balanced group contributions, BGC (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter, 1996). For all N ∈
N ,B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk),
we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk).
Weighted balanced group contributions, WBGC5. For all N ∈ N, B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W , Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk),
we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk)
wB`
.
Symmetry between components, SymBC6 (Winter, 1989). For all N ∈ N , B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and
Bk, B` are symmetric in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
Symmetry within components, SymWC7. For all N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈
LN, v ∈ GLN, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and all i ∈ Bk ∪ B`
are symmetric in v, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
4These axioms are extensions from null player out in Derks and Haller (1999).
5This axiom extends weighted balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980).
6This axiom is called coalitional symmetry in Winter (1989).
7This axiom extends the symmetry within coalitions axiom (see e.g. Winter (2002)) to players from
components of arbitrary levels.
7Weighted proportionality between components, WPBC8. For all N ∈ N , B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W , Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk),
and Bk, B` are dependent in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
.
Weighted proportionality within components, WPWC8. For all N ∈ N , B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W , Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk)
and all i ∈ Bk ∪B` are dependent in v, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all N ∈ N, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈
LN, v ∈ GLN, B∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br). (8)
4 The Shapley levels value
Winter (1989) used the Owen value (Owen, 1977) as a starting point for his LS-value.
Therefore Winter upgraded the efficiency, null player, symmetry and additivity axioms
to axioms for level structures where symmetry is splitted up in coalitional symmetry and
individual symmetry. If a level structure is defined as above, meaning that the singletons
are the elements of the lowest level, in Winter (1989, remark 1.6) is pointed out that the
individual symmetry can be omitted. In this sense we present Winter’s first axiomatization
of the Shapley levels value9.
Theorem 4.1. (Winter, 1989) ShL is the unique LS-Value that satisfies E, N, SymBC
and A.
There exist some further axiomatizations of the Shapley levels value (see Calvo, Lasaga
and Winter (1996), Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya (2007) and Casajus (2010)). Interest-
ingly, if some axiomatizations of the Shapley levels value will be adapted to extensions of
the weighted Shapley values to weighted Shapley levels values, we get different LS-values.
5 Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values
Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) presented an extension of a weighted Shapley value
to level structures where the weights are given by the size of the coalitions. They adapted
the procedure from the value ζ in Vidal-Puga (2012) and replaced the two-step approach
by a multi-step mechanism. We generalize their value to a value with arbitrary weights.
8In Nowak and Radzik (1995) the basic version of these axioms for TU-values is called ω-mutual depen-
dence. We call it weighted proportionality.
9Winter (1989) introduced his value axiomatically and used this axiomatization as a definition.
8Definition 5.1. Let N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and w ∈ W10. The weighted Shapley
hierarchy levels value ShwHL is defined by algorithm 5.1 below.
The substantial idea behind the algorithm is as follows: We have a weight system w ∈ W
for the coalitions. If coalitions S are regarded as players, we use a weight system w ∈W
with wS = wS, wS ∈ w, wS ∈ w. In a first step we distribute the worth of the grand
coalition v(N) among the components Bh of the h−th level as players using a weighted
Shapley value with weight system w. In the second step each payoff to a component Bh
from the first step is splitted up by the weighted Shapley value to all components Bh−1
(the new players) which are subsets of the component Bh and so on for all levels. In the
last step we distribute the payoff to components B1 from the first level among the original
players i ∈ N .
Algorithm 5.1. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, i ∈ N, w ∈ W, w ∈W
such that wS = wS, wS ∈ w, wS ∈ w, S ∈ ΩBh, Bh ∈ Bh, Shw a weighted Shapley value
and (R, v˜ri ) TU-games, where R are nonempty, pairwise disjoint sets of some subsets
S ∈ ΩBr(i), 1 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, with v˜ri (Q) := vri
(⋃
S∈Q S
)
for all Q ∈ ΩR, vri ∈ GBr(i). Take
vh+1i := v.
• Step k, 1 ≤ k ≤ h: Let r := h− k + 1. We define the TU-game (Br(i), vri ) by
vri (T ) := Sh
w
T
({
B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Br+1(i), B 6= Br(i)} ∪ {T}, v˜r+1i ) for all T ∈ ΩBr(i).
In particular, vri
(Br(i)) is the payoff assigned to component Br(i).
• Step h+1: The payoff ShwHL assigned to player i is given by
ShwHLi (N, v,B) := Shw{i}
({B ∈ B0 : B ⊆ B1(i)}, v˜1i ).
If h = 0, we only execute step h+ 1.
Remark 5.2. ShwHL coincides with Shw if B = B0. It is obvious, by construction, that
ShwHL satisfies E and LG. Shw is additive and thus ShwHL also meets A, but, as shown
in example 1 in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), ShwHL doesn’t satisfy N.
Similar to Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996), which characterized the Shapley levels value
by efficiency and balanced group contributions, Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) char-
acterized their value by efficiency and ”balanced per capita contributions”, a special case
of weighted balanced group contributions where the weights are the size of the relevant
components. We generalize their axiomatization:
Theorem 5.3. ShwHL is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E and WBGC.
The proof follows immediately by adapting the proofs of proposition 7 and theorem 8
in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), using weighted balanced contributions (Myerson,
1980; Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) for the weighted Shapley values in proposition 7 and
replacing the given weights (size of the components) by arbitrary weights in theorem 8.
Remark 5.4. If all weights are equal, we use in fact in each step in algorithm 5.1 the
Shapley value and WBGC equals BGC. So, by Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996), algo-
rithm 5.1 defines in this case the Shapley levels value ShL.
10In fact, we need only weights for coalitions S ∈ ΩBh, Bh ∈ Bh.
96 Weighted Shapley support levels values
In difference to a strong hierarchy where all actions are organized top down we define the
following values more bottom up. The players join forces and form components of the
first level, the players of the components of the first level federate to components of the
second level and so on. The characterizing part in the following value is that each player
is ”supported” for her share of the related dividends by all components including her.
Definition 6.1. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W11 and for all
T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
Kw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Krw,T (i), where (9)
Krw,T (i) :=
wBr(i)∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
.
The weighted Shapley support levels value ShwSL is given by
ShwSLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (10)
Remark 6.2. We see that the Shapley levels value is a weighted Shapley support levels
value where all components have the same weight. ShwSL coincides with Shw if B = B0
and, if B = B1, the Kw,T (i) coincide with the λSi given in Dragan (1992, sec. 2(e)).
Therefore, in this case, the ShwSL coincide with the McLean weighted coalition structure
values (Dragan, 1992; Levy and McLean, 1989; McLean, 1991).
Theorem 6.3. The weighted Shapley support levels values ShwSL satisfy E, D, N, A,
M/CSE, LG, WPBC and WPWC.
For the proof, see appendix 11.1.
6.1 A characterization similar to Winter
The first axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values in Nowak and Radzik (1995) is
based on efficiency, null player, weighted proportionality and additivity12 for TU-games.
So weighted proportionality replaces symmetry in the classical axiomatization of the Shap-
ley value (Shapley, 1953b). Our axiomatization is based on the same axioms extended
to LS-games, replacing symmetry between components in theorem 4.1 by weighted pro-
portionality between components. So we have a ”weighted” analogue to theorem 4.1.
Theorem 6.4. ShwSL is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, N, WPBC and A.
For the proof13, see appendix 11.2.
11In fact, we need only weights for the components B ∈ B.
12Nowak and Radzik (1995) used linearity instead additivity, but theorem 6.4 shows that additivity can
substitute linearity.
13Replacing dependent by symmetric and WPBC by SymBC and using that players i, j ∈ N are
symmetric in v if ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}), we get a new proof of theorem 4.1.
10
6.2 A characterization similar to Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya
Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya (2007) characterized the Shapley levels value in the sense
of Young (1985) by efficiency, symmetry between components14 and marginality15. In
Casajus and Huettner (2008) is shown that coalitional strategic equivalence and marginal-
ity are equivalent in TU-games. Their proof obviously holds for LS-games too. We obtain
a characterisation which is also an extension of theorem 2.3 in Nowak and Radzik (1995).
Theorem 6.5. ShwSL is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, WPBC and M/CSE.
For the proof, see appendix 11.3.
7 Weighted Shapley alliance levels values
The classes of weighted Shapley levels values above satisfy the level game property. But
this is not the case for our two last classes. These classes of values allow the players,
within the hierarchy of the level structure, to act more independent. So in the following
class they can form subgroups with an own weight within the components containing
them.
Look, for example, to a game where the whole world is the grand coalition. The world
splits up in political unions like the European Union (EU) and countries which remain
fully autonomous. Within the EU many countries are organized as a federal state or a
comparable system and so on. But within the EU are also powerful subgroups possible
like the euro area. Using a weighted Shapley support levels value the euro area has to
get, outside of the EU, the same weight as the whole EU! Instead, the following class of
values assigns the euro area exactly the worth it has itself.
Definition 7.1. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W16 and for all
T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
Aw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Arw,T (i), where (11)
Arw,T (i) :=
wBr(i)∩T∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
.
The weighted Shapley alliance levels value ShwAL is given by
ShwALi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Aw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (12)
Theorem 7.2. The weighted Shapley alliance levels values ShwAL satisfy E, D, N, NO,
A, M/CSE and WPWC.
14Also here individual symmetry can be dropped if the singletons are the elements of the lowest level.
15Youngs original axiom is called strong monotonicity. In Chun (1989) the essential part of this axiom
for the proof of the uniqueness is named marginality.
16In fact, we need only weights for coalitions S ∈ ΩBh, Bh ∈ Bh.
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For the proof, see appendix 11.4. We get an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
alliance levels values which corresponds in case of a trivial level structure to an axioma-
tization of the weighted Shapley values too.
Theorem 7.3. ShwAL is the unique LS-Value that satisfies E, NO, WPWC and A.
For the proof, see appendix 11.5. We have an interesting special case if the weights are
the size of the components.
Proposition 7.4. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and w ∈ W such that
wS = |S| for all S ∈ ΩBh, Bh∈ Bh, wS ∈ w. Then we have
ShwALi (N, v,B) = Shi(N, v) for all i ∈ N.
For the proof, see appendix 11.6.
7.1 A new characterization of the Shapley levels value
If all weights are equal, the coefficients Aw,T (i) from def. 7.1 equal the KT (i) from expres-
sion (6) in the definition of the Shapley levels value. Thus we obtain, if we replace in the
proof of theorem 7.3 dependent by symmetric and WPWC by SymWC the following
corollary.
Corollary 7.5. ShL is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, NO, SymWC and A.
8 Weighted Shapley collaboration levels values
In the following class of weighted Shapley levels values only subgroups of a component
which are a component of a lower level can act more independently. For instance, we
look at the regions of Europe, the regions merge to independent countries and most of the
countries are members of the EU or autonomous nations like Norway. The Nordic Council
is a geo-political forum where Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are full
members. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are also members of the EU, but within the
Nordic Council these countries don’t act together with a weight support, given by the EU,
as by the weighted Shapley support levels values, nor they form an alliance with an own
weight as by the weighted Shapley alliance levels values. Here each of these countries act
autonomous as a single component and the following class of values gives a good model
for such situations.
Definition 8.1. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W17 and for all
T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
Cw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Crw,T (i), with (13)
Crw,T (i) :=
wBrT(i)∑
B∈B̂r+1T (i)
wB
,
17In fact, we need only weights for the components B ∈ B.
12
where BrT (i) is the largest component B`(i), 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, with B`(i) ⊆ T, Bh+1T (i) := T and
B̂r+1T (i) :=
{{BrT (i)}, if BrT (i) = Br+1T (i),{
B ∈ B : B ( Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
, else,
is the set of all largest components which are subsets of Br+1T (i). The weighted Shapley
collaboration levels value ShwCL is given by
ShwCLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Cw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (14)
Theorem 8.2. The weighted Shapley collaboration levels values ShwCL satisfy E, D, N,
INO, A, M/CSE and WPWC.
For the proof, see appendix 11.7. Also the following axiomatization extends an axioma-
tization of the weighted Shapley values.
Theorem 8.3. ShwCL is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, INO, WPWC and A.
For the proof, see appendix 11.8. We obtain an interesting special case if the weights are
the size of the components again.
Proposition 8.4. Let N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and w ∈ W such that wB = |B| for all
B ∈ B, wB ∈ w. Then we have
ShwCLi (N, v,B) = Shi(N, v) for all i ∈ N.
For the proof, see appendix 11.9
9 The Shapley collaboration levels value
As a special case of the weighted Shapley collaboration levels values we can present an
extension of the Shapley value to level structures.
Definition 9.1. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, and for all T ⊆ N,
T 3 i,
CT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
CrT (i), with
CrT (i) :=
1∣∣B̂r+1T (i)∣∣ ,
where BrT(i) is the largest component B`(i), 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, B`(i) ⊆ T , Bh+1T (i) := T and
B̂r+1T (i) :=
{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
is the set of all largest
components which are subsets of Br+1T (i). The Shapley collaboration levels value
ShCL is given by
ShCLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
CT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
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Def. 9.1 coincides with def. 8.1 if all weights are equal. If we replace in the proof of
theorem 8.3 dependent by symmetric and WPWC by SymWC, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 9.2. ShCL is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, INO, SymWC and A.
10 Conclusion
The rapidly increasing volume of collected data and global networking make it possible
and necessary to share benefits between cooperating participants, often structured hier-
archical. To distribute generated surpluses the presented four new classes of LS-values
contain alternatives to the Shapley levels value, founded on convincing axioms, if there
exist exogenous given weights for some coalitions.
The weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values meet with the multi-stage mechanism a
widespread idea how a hierarchical value has to operate. But, besides the Shapley levels
value, these values don’t satisfy the null player property in general.
In numerous situations it seems justified that a null player should receive a zero payoff.
This is the case in our classes which are part of the Harsanyi set. The class of the
weighted Shapley support levels values appears to be the most popular class of them.
These values extend the McLean weighted coalition structure values, satisfy the level
game property, can be axiomatized by adapted classical axiomatizations of the Shapley
levels value (Winter, 1989; Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya, 2007) and contain the Shapley
levels value as well, which satisfies a null player out property. In general, however, this
property is not fulfilled by these values.
If we use the restriction of an LS-game (the same restriction as normally used for
coalition structures), the weighted Shapley alliance levels values satisfy the null player
out property and contain the Shapley levels value too.
So this paper also opens different perspectives on the Shapley levels value. But a level
structure is more then just a sequence of coalition structures, the coalition structures are
ordered. Thus we introduced an internally induced restriction, which should be used for
example in the case that a component splits in the components next in size if one player
quits the component. The weighted Shapley collaboration levels values satisfy the null
player out property for internally induced restrictions. So we have found a situation where
the Shapley levels value fails and a new extension of the Shapley value, called Shapley
collaboration levels value, has been introduced.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Andre´ Casajus and Winfried Hochsta¨ttler for
their helpful comments and suggestions.
11 Appendix
Convention 11.1. To avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proves using WPBC
(SymBC) or WPWC (SymWC), if there is only one single player assessed in isola-
tion, she is defined as dependent (symmetric) by herself. Then WPBC (SymBC) and
14
WPWC (SymWC) are trivially satisfied.
Lemma 11.2. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Each S ∈ ΩN
is a subset of exactly one coalition T r ∈ ΩN, T r = ⋃Br⊆T r, Br∈Br,
Br∩S 6=∅
Br. Thus each S ∈ ΩN is
also uniquely referred to as ST r .
Proof. Each coalition T r∈ ΩN is a union of components B ∈ Br. Br is a partition and so
each player i ∈ S, S ∈ ΩN, is contained in only one component B ∈ Br. Thus exists for
each coalition S ∈ ΩN exactly one coalition T r∈ ΩN which is a union of all components
B ∈ Br containing at least one player i ∈ S.
Lemma 11.3. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
and ST r the coalitions from lemma 11.2 with related coalitions T
r. Then we have in the
induced game (Br, vr,Br) for each T r∈ ΩBr, related to T r∈ ΩN,
∆vr(T r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r). (15)
Proof. Let t = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r}| the number of components B ∈ Br which are subsets
from a coalition T r∈ ΩN with T r∈ ΩBr. We use induction on the size t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |Br|.
Initialisation: Let t = 1. T r is a component B ∈ Br and T r is a player in vr. We have
∆vr(T r) =
(1)
vr(T r) =
(4)
v(T r) =
(1)
∑
S⊆T r
∆v(S) =
Lem.
11.2
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Induction step: Assume that eq. (15) holds for an arbitrary tˆ ≥ 1 (IH). Let now Tˆ r∈
ΩB
r
with correlated Tˆ r ∈ ΩN, tˆ = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Tˆ r}| and T r = Tˆ r ∪ Bˆ, Bˆ ∈ Br, Bˆ 6⊆ Tˆ r.
We have t = tˆ+ 1 and it follows
∆vr(T r) =
(1)
∑
Qr⊆T r
∆vr(Qr) =
(1)
(4)
v(T r)−
∑
Qr(T r
∆vr(Qr)
=
(1)
(IH)
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
Qr(T r,
Qr⊆Br
∑
SQr⊆Qr
∆v(SQr)
=
Lem.
11.2
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
S(T r,
S 6=STr
∆v(S)
= ∆v(T
r) +
∑
STr(T r
∆v(ST r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Lemma 11.4. Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are dependent in v ∈ GN, iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0,
k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and v ∈ GN. We show by induction on the size s := |S| of all
coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}
∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0 ⇔ v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}). (16)
Initialisation: If S = ∅ and so s = 0, statement (16) is satisfied.
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Induction step: Assume that equality in (16) and such equivalence hold for all coalitions
S˜ ⊆ N\{i, j}, |S˜| ≤ s′, s′ ≥ 0, (IH) and let s = s′ + 1 and k ∈ {i, j}. We get
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) +
∑
R((S∪{k})
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔
(IH)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) + ∆v({k}) +
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Remark 11.5. It is well-known or easy to prove that statement (7) in CSE can be re-
placed equivalently by
∆v(S) =
{
∆v′(T ) + c, if S = T,
∆v′(S), otherwise.
11.1 Proof of theorem 6.3
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈ GLN, w ∈ W and Kw,T and Krw,T the
expressions according to def. 6.1.
• E, D, N, A, M/CSE: Let T ∈ ΩN, j ∈ T. It is easy to show, by induction on r, that
∑
i∈Br+1(j), i∈T
r∏
`=0
Krw,T (i) = 1.
So
∑
i∈T Kw,T (i) = 1 and, with Kw,T (i) > 0, i ∈ T, the Kw,T (i) form a dividend share
system p ∈ PN and ShwSL is a Harsanyi payoff. Therefore ShwSL satisfies all axioms which
are satisfied by a Harsanyi payoff, in particular E, D, N, A and M/CSE are well-known
matched axioms.
• LG: Let Br∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1. If r = 0, eq. (8) trivially is satisfied because the 0-th
level game corresponds to the original LS-game, if r = h+ 1, eq. (8) is satisfied by E.
Let now 1 ≤ r ≤ h. We have for all S ⊆ N, S ∩Br 6= ∅,
∑
i∈Br, i∈S
r−1∏
`=0
K`w,S(i) = 1. (17)
In the game (Br, vr,Br) we have for all T r∈ ΩBr, Br∈ T r,
Kw,T r(Br) =
h∏
`=r
K`−rw,T r(B
r). (18)
Let i ∈ Br, r ≤ ` ≤ h and ST r the coalitions from lemma 11.2 with related coalitions T r.
We have B`(i) = B`(Br). Notice that for each T r ∈ ΩBr, related to T r ∈ ΩN, if i ∈ ST r ,
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we have also Br∈ T r. It follows for all ST r ∈ ΩN, i ∈ ST r ,
K`w,STr (i) =
wB`(i)∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(i),
B∩STr 6=∅
wB
=
Lem.
11.2
wB`(Br)∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(Br),
B∩T r 6=∅
wB
=
(5)
wBr`−r(Br)∑
B∈Br`−r:B⊆Br`+1−r(Br),
B∩T r 6=∅
wB
= K`−rw,T r(B
r). (19)
Thus we have for all ST r ∈ ΩN, Br∈ T r, T r∈ ΩBr,∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
Kw,STr (i) =
(9)
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
h∏
`=0
K`w,STr (i) =(19)
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
r−1∏
`=0
K`w,STr (i)
h∏
`=r
K`−rw,T r(B
r)
=
(17)
h∏
`=r
K`−rw,T r(B
r) =
(18)
Kw,T r(Br). (20)
Finally we get∑
i∈Br
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(10)
∑
i∈Br
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
Kw,S(i)∆v(S) =
Lem.
11.2
∑
i∈Br
∑
STr⊆N,
STr3i
Kw,STr (i)∆v(ST r)
=
∑
STr⊆N
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
Kw,STr (i)∆v(ST r) =
(20)
∑
STr⊆N,T r3Br
Kw,T r(Br)∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
11.2
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kw,T r(Br)
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
11.3
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kw,T r(Br)∆vr(T r) = ShwSLBr (Br, vr,Br).
• WPBC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and Br(k),Br(`) be dependent in
(Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr. If r = 0, we get
ShwSLk (N, v,B)
w{k}
=
(10)
∑
T⊆N,T3k
Kw,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T ) =
Lem.
11.4
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kw,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T )
=
Def.
6.1
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kw,T (`)
w{`}
∆v(T ) =
ShwSL` (N, v,B)
w{`}
.
Thus we have also in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShwSLBr(k)(Br, vr,Br)
wBr(k)
=
ShwSLBr(`)(Br, vr,Br)
wBr(`)
and the claim follows by LG.
• WPWC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and all players i ∈ Br(k) ∪ Br(`)
be dependent in v. We get∑
i∈Br(k)
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
wBr(k)
=
Def.
6.1
1
wBr(k)
∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,
T3i
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(T )
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=
Lem.
11.4
1
wBr(k)
∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(T )
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∑
i∈Br(k)
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(T )
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
[
h∏
j=r
wBj(k)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
·
∑
i∈Br(k)
r−1∏
j=0
wBj(i)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
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]
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r
wBj(k)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
=
1
wBr(`)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r
wBj(`)∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(`),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
=
∑
i∈Br(`)
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
wBr(`)
.
11.2 Proof of theorem 6.4
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W , S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ an
LS-value which satisfies all axioms of theorem 6.4. Due to theorem 6.3, property (3) and
A, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
By lemma 11.2 exists for each level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, exactly one coalition T rS , T rS ⊆ Br,
which is the smallest coalition of all Rr, Rr ⊇ S, with correlated Rr⊆ Br and so in each
game
(Br, vrS,Br) ∈ GLBr we have ∆vrS(T rS ) = ∆v(S) and ∆vrS(Rr) = 0 for Rr ⊆ Br, Rr 6=T rS . Therefore, by lemma 11.4, possibly using conv. 11.1, all components B ∈ Br, B∩S 6=
∅, are dependent in vrS. If B ∈ Br, B ∩ S = ∅, we have
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0 by N.
We use induction on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h, for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h−r.
Initialisation: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
wB
wBh(i)
∑
j∈Bh(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(E)
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S). (21)
Induction step: Assume that eq. (21) holds to ϕ with an arbitrary m−1, 0 ≤ m−1 ≤ h−1
18If r = 0, we have an empty product, which is equal, by convention, to the multiplicative identity 1.
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(IH). It follows for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
wB
wBr(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
=
(IH)
[ h∏
k=h−m+1
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S).
So ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
11.3 Proof of theorem 6.5
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W and ϕ an LS-value which satisfies
all axioms of theorem 6.5. By theorem 6.3 we have only to show that ϕ satisfies eq. (10).
We use a first induction I1 on t := |{T ⊆ N : T is active in v}|.
Initialisation I1: Let t = 0, then for all games (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, vr is
identically zero on all coalitions. So all players, possibly using conv. 11.1, are dependent
in each game vr and for all Brk, B
r
` ∈ Br, Br` ⊆ Br+1(Brk) we have∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBrk
=
(WPBC)
∑
i∈Br`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBr`
.
We use a second induction I2 on the size m := h− r to show∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and Br∈ Br. (22)
Initialisation I2: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary B
h
k ∈ Bh∑
Bh∈Bh
∑
i∈Bh
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Bh∈Bh
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(E)
0.
Thus follows
∑
i∈Bh ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all Bh∈ Bh because wBh > 0 and Bhk was arbitrary.
Induction step I2: Assume that eq. (22) holds to ϕ if m ≥ 0 (IH2). We get for an
arbitrary Brk ∈ Br∑
Br∈Br,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Br∈Br,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(IH2)
0.
It follows
∑
i∈Br ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and Br ∈ Br. Therefore we have also
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all i ∈ N and eq. (10) is satisfied for ϕ if t = 0.
Induction step I1: Assume that eq. (10) holds to ϕ if t ≥ 0, (IH1). Let exactly t + 1
coalitions Qk ⊆ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ t+ 1, active in v and denote
Q =
⋂
1≤k≤t+1
Qk.
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We distinguish two cases: (a) i ∈ N\Q and (b) i ∈ Q.
(a) Each player i ∈ N\Q is a member of at most t active coalitions Qk and v gets at
least one active coalition Ti, i /∈ Ti. Hence exists a coalition function vi ∈ GLN, where
all coalitions have the same dividend in vi as in v, except the coalition Ti, which gets the
dividend ∆vi(Ti) = 0, and there is existing a scalar c ∈ R, c 6= 0, with
∆v(S) =
{
∆vi(Ti) + c, if S = Ti,
∆vi(S), else.
By remark 11.5 and CSE we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(vi) with i ∈ N\Ti and, because there exists
for all i ∈ N\Q a such Ti, it follows ϕi(v) = ϕi(vi) for all i ∈ N\Q. All coalition functions
vi get at most t active coalitions and by (IH1) we have
ϕi(v) = Sh
wSL
i (N, v,B) for all i ∈ N\Q. (23)
(b) Each player j ∈ Q is a member of all t+ 1 active coalitions Qk ⊆ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ t+ 1,
and therefore, by lemma 11.4 and conv. 11.1, all players j ∈ Q are dependent in v. Now
we define for each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, a set
BrQ = {Br∈ Br : Br∩Q 6= ∅}.
Note that all components Brk, B
r
` ∈ BrQ, Br` ⊆ Br+1(Brk), are dependent in vr. We use a
third induction I3 on the size s := h− r to show for all Brk ∈ BrQ∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSLi (N, v,B). (24)
Initialisation I3: Let s = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary B
h
k ∈ BhQ∑
Bh∈BhQ
∑
i∈Bh
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B)
=
(E)
(23)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
∑
i∈Bh
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
⇔
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bhk
ShwSLi (N, v,B).
Induction step I3: Assume that eq. (24) holds to ϕ if s ≥ 0 (IH3). We get for an
arbitrary Brk ∈ BrQ and because Br+1(Brk) ∈ Br+1Q∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B)
=
(IH3)
(23)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(WPBC)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSL(N, v,B)
⇔
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
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and so finally
ϕi(N, v,B) = ShwSLi (N, v,B) for all i ∈ Q.
By Casajus and Huettner (2008) M and CSE are equivalent and the proof is complete.
11.4 Proof of theorem 7.2
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v, v′∈ GLN and w ∈ W .
• E, D, N, A, M/CSE: Analogous to the proof of theorem 6.3, the Aw,T (i) from
def. 7.1 form a dividend share system p ∈ PN for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i, and so ShwAL is
a Harsanyi payoff. Therefore ShwAL satisfies all axioms which are satisfied by a Harsanyi
payoff, in particular E, D, N, A and M/CSE.
• NO: It is well-known that each coalition S containing a null player j ∈ N in v is not
active in v. In eq. (12) we have only to consider active coalitions. But for these coalitions
is no change in the weights. We get ShwALi (N, v,B) = ShwALi (N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all
i ∈ N\{j}.
• WPWC: The proof is omitted because it is completely analogues to the proof of
WPWC in theorem 6.3. We have only to replace the relevant weights wB by wB∩T .
11.5 Proof of theorem 7.3
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W , S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ an LS-
value which satisfies all axioms of theorem 7.3 and N, because E and NO imply obvious
N. Due to theorem 7.2, property (3) and A, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely
defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
All players i ∈ N\S are null players in vS and we have ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0 for all i ∈ N\S
by N. All players i ∈ S, possibly using conv. 11.1, are dependent in vS and, by NO, we
get
ϕi(N, vS,B) = ϕi(S, vS,B|S) for all i ∈ S.
So we can use an analogue induction as in the proof of theorem 6.4, here on the restriction
to player set S and where WPBC must be replaced by WPWC, and get that ϕ is
uniquely defined on vS.
11.6 Proof of proposition 7.4
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh} ∈ LN and w ∈ W such that wS = |S| for all S ∈ ΩBh,
Bh∈ Bh, wS ∈ w. We have only to show that
Aw,T (i) =
1
|T | for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i.
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For all T ⊆ N, T 3 i, and 0 ≤ r ≤ h the set B˜r+1T (i) := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ⊆
Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅} is a partition of Br+1(i) ∩ T . So we have∑
B∈B˜r+1T (i)
wB∩T =
∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T = |Br+1(i) ∩ T |.
By eq. (11) we get Aw,T (i) =
1
|T | as desired.
11.7 Proof of theorem 8.2
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈ GLN and w ∈ W .
• E, D, N, A, M/CSE: It is obvious, analogous to the proof of theorem 6.3, that the
Cw,T (i) from def. 8.1 form a dividend share system p ∈ PN for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i, and so
ShwCL is a Harsanyi payoff. Therefore ShwCL satisfies all axioms which are satisfied by a
Harsanyi payoff, in particular E, D, N, A and M/CSE.
• INO: Similar to the proof of NO in theorem 7.2 we have no change in the weights
for eq. (14) and thus get ShwCLi (N, v,B) = ShwCLi (N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j},
j ∈ N a null player in v.
• WPWC: The proof is omitted because it is completely analogues to the proof of
WPWC in theorem 6.3.
11.8 Proof of theorem 8.3
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, w ∈ W , S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ an
LS-value which satisfies all axioms of theorem 8.3 and N, because E and INO imply N
what is easy to see. Due to theorem 8.2, property (3) and A, it is sufficient to show that
ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
All players j ∈ N\S are null players and we have ϕj(N, vS,B) = 0 for all j ∈ N\S by
N. All players i ∈ S, possibly using conv. 11.1, are dependent in vS and, by INO, we get
ϕi(N, vS,B) = ϕi(S, vS,BI |S) for all i ∈ S.
So we can use an analogue induction as in the proof of theorem 6.4, here on the internally
induced restriction to player set S and where WPBC must be replaced by WPWC, and
obtain that ϕ is uniquely defined on vS.
11.9 Proof of proposition 8.4
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0,B1, ...,Bh} ∈ LN and w ∈ W such that wB = |B| for all B ∈ B,
wB ∈ w. We have only to show that
Cw,T (i) =
1
|T | for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i.
For all T ⊆ N, T 3 i, and 0 ≤ r ≤ h the set B̂r+1T (i) is a partition of Br+1T (i). So we have∑
B∈B̂r+1T (i)
wB = |Br+1T (i)|. By eq. (13) we get Cw,T (i) =
1
|T | as desired.
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11.10 Logical independence
All axiomatizations must also hold if B = B0. In this case all axioms, used for axiomatiza-
tion in this paper, coincide with usual axioms for TU-values. So the given axiomatizations
coincide in this case with axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values and the Shapley
value, respectively. It is well-known or easy to proof that in this case the used axioms are
logical independent. Therefore all axioms for LS-values must be also logical independent
in the given axiomatizations.
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